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Abstract
I investigate the relationship between widowhood and the nancial situation among women aged 50
and above in Europe. The results of the paper are based on the Survey of Health, Ageing and Retirement
in Europe, and its retrospective third wave (SHARELIFE). Using retrospective data makes it possible
to analyze the dynamics of the adverse e¤ects of widowhood. I estimate both the short run and long run
e¤ects of widowhood on nancial circumstances, health, and labor force status. I argue that not only
the lack of the deceased husbands income, but also the worse health condition and earlier retirement of
widows contribute to the unfavorable nancial conditions, although these indirect e¤ects are small. I also
analyze the role survivorspensions have in mitigating the adverse e¤ects of widowhood, and provide
evidence for varying compensating e¤ects of survivorspensions in the European countries analyzed.
Keywords: widows, poverty, survivorspension, SHARE, SHARELIFE
JEL Classication: I32, J14
1 Introduction
Old-age poverty is strongly associated with the poverty of widowed women. In this paper I analyze the
nancial situation of widows in Europe. Using a rich set of cross-national household level data, I can provide
new evidence on the magnitude and timing of the adverse e¤ects of widowhood. The results of this paper
are based on the Survey of Health, Ageing and Retirement in Europe (SHARE).
Based on the second wave of SHARE, half of the widows who are aged 50 and above report nancial
di¢ culties, which is around ten percentage points higher than the similar ratio among married women within
the same age category. Such di¤erence cannot be seen among men. Apart from the lack of the deceased
husbands income, other factors can also contribute to the poverty of widows. Therefore I investigate the short
and long run e¤ects of widowhood not only on nancial circumstances, but also on health and employment
status. Health problems and early exit from the labor market can exacerbate the deprivation in widowhood.
I use the second and third waves of SHARE. The second wave is a cross sectional survey of individuals
aged 50 and above, whereas the third wave, which is called SHARELIFE, is a retrospective survey of the same
population. The second wave of the survey makes it possible to analyze the persistent e¤ects of widowhood
on the living conditions at older ages, whereas the retrospective third wave data provide evidence on the
short run and dynamic e¤ects of widowhood. In the empirical analysis I take into account that selection into
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widowhood is not random: even before widowhood, widows have on average poorer socioeconomic status
than the rest of the female population.
The estimation results indicate that the death of the husband has immediate adverse e¤ects on the
nancial, health, and labor market status of the widow. These e¤ects are on average long lasting, but
are less severe for those widows who were less dependent on the husbands income. I also analyze the
cross country di¤erences in the negative e¤ects of widowhood on nancial circumstances. This analysis
can provide some insights into the e¢ ciency of the various social security systems in preventing widows
poverty. There are cross country di¤erences in these e¤ects, however the variation in the negative e¤ect of
widowhood on nancial status cannot be explained by the di¤erences in the overall generosity of survivors
pensions. Eligibility rules and di¤erential survivorspension benets can help mitigate the adverse e¤ects of
widowhood.
The rest of the paper is structured as follows. In section 2 I provide a review of the related literature
and discuss my contributions. In section 3 I describe the data, and in section 4 I present the estimation
results. I relate the estimation results to the survivorspension systems of the analyzed countries in section
5. Section 6 concludes.
2 Related literature
The death of the spouse is a major life course event with long lasting adverse e¤ects. The e¤ects of
widowhood are analyzed by researchers in various disciplines. For example, Umberson et al. (1992) and
Bennett et al. (2005) focus on depression related to widowhood, whereas Ferraro et al. (1984) analyze how
the death of the spouse inuences the health and friendship support of older people. In this paper my focus
is on the short run and long run economic consequences of widowhood.
The main contributions of my paper are to provide an international comparison on the nancial situation
of widows in Europe, and to investigate the inuencing role of employment, health, and social security
systems on the living conditions of widows. As an additional novelty, I utilize the retrospective nature of
the third wave of SHARE, based on which I analyze the dynamics of the adverse e¤ects of widowhood.
The rst line of the related literature provides evidence on the relative poverty of widows. My ndings
on the relative poverty of widows are in line with the facts documented in the related literature. Using the
European Community Household Panel data, Ahn (2005) documents that widowers have on average higher
income than widows, and the income di¤erences across countries and between genders are larger for those
living alone. Due to widowhood the income of women decreases more than of men. According to Ahn, the
ratio of household income after and before widowhood ranges between 50  90%, with substantial variations
across the countries in Europe. Using SHARE data, Tinios et al. (2011) provide evidence that widowhood
signicantly increases the probability of persistent poverty, but they do not investigate how this inuencing
mechanism works. Thus I extend their analysis by looking at the immediate and also at the indirect e¤ects
of widowhood.
The second line of the related literature looks at the factors leading to the poverty of widows. Smith and
Zick (1996) analyze the increased mortality risk and worse health status of the surviving spouse. Potential
reasons can be the bereavement, stress, and role changes associated with widowhood. Smith and Zick base
their empirical analysis on the US based Panel Study of Income Dynamics and death certicate information,
and they nd an elevated mortality risk among widowers, especially if the death of the spouse was sudden.
On the other hand, for widows they do not nd a signicant increase in mortality, which they explain by the
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lack of need for role changes and by emotional preparedness. In this paper I do not investigate the e¤ect of
widowhood on mortality, but present results on its e¤ect on morbidity.
Based on the SHARE data I also provide some evidence on the selection into widowhood. This is
important since the poverty of widows might be partly due to non-random selection, and to di¤erent economic
decisions prior to the death of the husband. These considerations are related to Hurd and Wise (1989), who
analyze the circumstances that lead to the disproportionate poverty of widows in the US. They nd that
one explanatory factor of poverty is the low accumulation of wealth prior to the death of the husband. Hurd
and Wise also nd that poor widows lose a higher percentage of the household wealth with the death of the
husband than those who are better-o¤, partly because of the absence of life insurance. In a related study,
Sevak et al. (2003/2004) claim that the poverty of widows in the US is not only due to the lost income of
the husband but also to selection. Based on the Health and Retirement Study, they provide evidence that
poor women are more likely to become widow, and a substantial number of widows in poverty were poor
also during marriage. They also nd positive relationship between poverty and the duration of widowhood,
for which based on the SHARE data I nd only mixed evidence.
The retrospective SHARELIFE data make it possible to analyze the dynamics of poverty and other
adverse e¤ects of widowhood in a cross-country perspective. The related papers in the literature focus either
on a single country, or if they compare the dynamic e¤ects of widowhood across countries then the comparison
is restricted by the comparability of di¤erent data sources (see e.g. Mu¤els et al. 2000, although their focus
is not in particular on the e¤ects of widowhood but more generally on income and poverty dynamics). Smith
and Zick (1986) use the Panel Study of Income Dynamics to analyze both the short run and long run e¤ects
of widowhood in the US, and Holden et al. (1988) use the Retirement History Study data to analyze the
dynamic e¤ects of retirement and widowhood, nding that for widows in the US the high risk of becoming
poor is in the rst years of widowhood.
In this paper I also analyze to what extent the survivorspension systems can moderate the adverse
e¤ects of widowhood. Survivorspension benets are needed to ensure su¢ cient income for the surviving
spouse. However, survivorspensions can also imply e¢ ciency losses through disincentives to work, and can
also lead to unintended redistributions. These issues are discussed in more details by Estelle (2009). My
analysis is related to Siegenthaler (1996), who compares ve European countries and the US in preventing
poverty among widows. Based on this comparison he concludes that those old-age security systems are the
most e¢ cient in preventing poverty which provide a minimum income to all. Monticone et al. (2008) give
an overview of survivorspensions in the EU. All countries provide some type of survivorspension, although
the conditions for eligibility are becoming increasingly strict. My analysis on the role of survivorspensions
in mitigating the poverty of widows is also related to Burkhauser et al. (2005). They compare the economic
e¤ects of widowhood in Canada, Germany, Great Britain, and the US. Using individual level data from the
Cross-National Equivalent File they focus on the size and variation of private and public income sources
that can o¤set the loss of the husbands income. I use country specic indicators of the generosity of the
survivorspensions instead of the individual replacement rates of the pensions, and relate these indicators
to the estimated e¤ects of widowhood.
3 Descriptive statistics
I use data from SHARE and SHARELIFE. The Survey of Health, Ageing and Retirement in Europe is
a multidisciplinary and cross-national panel database. It covers individuals aged 50 and above and their
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spouses. The rst wave of the SHARE data was collected in 2004-2005, the second wave in 2006-2007.
SHARELIFE is the third wave of data collection for SHARE, conducted in 2008-2009. It focuses on the
SHARE respondentslife histories.1
Based on the second wave of SHARE, 7:3% of men and 25:1% of women in the sample are widowed.
Table 1 provides some comparison on the age, economic background, and health status of widows, widowers,
and the control group. The control group consists of married individuals, living together with the spouse
(analyzing the nancial status of single and divorced women is out of the scope of this paper). The binary
indicator of nancial di¢ culty is set to one if the household reports to make ends meet with great di¢ culty or
with some di¢ culty. The consumption, wealth and income indicators are purchasing power parity adjusted,
discounted to year 2005, and are divided by the square root of household size. The basic nancial variables
are measured on the household level, and I use the square root of household size in order to account for the
returns to scale within households. In section 4.2 I discuss the robustness of my results with respect to the
assumption about household returns to scale. For the sake of simplication, the mean of the ve SHARE-
imputations is used here. Christelis (2011) provides details on how the missing values of some SHARE
variables are imputed. The self-reported health is on the 1-5 scale, with 1 corresponding to excellent, and
5 corresponding to poor health status. The objective health indicators (chronic health conditions, activities
of daily living (ADL) di¢ culties, symptoms) are generated based on the reported health problems of the
respondents.2
The presented statistics indicate that the widowed are older and in worse health status than those who
live with a spouse. The worse health status can be the consequence of higher average age of those who are
widowed. There are considerable di¤erences between the two genders in terms of the economic indicators.
The gender di¤erences reect the di¤erent position of husbands and wives in the households, husbands being
on average less dependent on the wivesincome. As for males, the reported (per capita) wealth and income
of widowers are smaller than of the control group, but these di¤erences are of moderate magnitude. The
subjective indicator of nancial di¢ culties is approximately equal for the two subgroups of males, reporting
nancial di¢ culties is slightly less prevalent among the widowers. On the other hand, widowed females report
considerably lower income, wealth, and also more severe nancial status than those who are married. The
di¤erence in consumption expenditures according to marital status is also larger for females than for males.
These ndings indicate that poverty in widowhood a¤ects the females more than the males in terms of these
observed economic indicators. According to the t-test of the equality of means, the subgroup di¤erences are
signicant at the 1% signicance level, with the exception of the reported nancial di¢ culties and wealth
indicators for males (the reported p-values refer to two-tailed t-tests, without assuming equal variances across
the subgroups).
At the bottom part of Table 1 I report two measures of poverty by marital status and gender. The rst
1This paper uses data from SHARELIFE release 1, as of November 24th 2010 and from SHARE release 2.4.0, as of March
17th 2011. The SHARE data collection has been primarily funded by the European Commission through the 5th framework
programme (project QLK6-CT-2001- 00360 in the thematic programme Quality of Life), through the 6th framework programme
(projects SHARE-I3, RII-CT- 2006-062193, COMPARE, CIT5-CT-2005-028857, and SHARELIFE, CIT4-CT-2006-028812) and
through the 7th framework programme (SHARE-PREP, 211909 and SHARE-LEAP, 227822). Additional funding from the U.S.
National Institute on Aging (U01 AG09740-13S2, P01 AG005842, P01 AG08291, P30 AG12815, Y1-AG-4553-01 and OGHA
04-064, IAG BSR06-11, R21 AG025169) as well as from various national sources is gratefully acknowledged (see www.share-
project.org for a full list of funding institutions).
2The chronic health conditions include heart attack, high blood pressure, high blood cholesterol, stroke, diabetes, chronic
lung disease, asthma, arthritis, osteoporosis, cancer, stomach ulcer, Parkinson disease, cataracts, hip or fremoral fracture.
The ADL di¢ culties include di¢ culties with dressing, walking across a room, eating, bathing, getting in or out of bed, and
using the toilet.
The health symptoms include pain in a joint, heart trouble, breathlessness, persistent cough, swollen legs, sleeping problems,
falling down, fear of falling down, dizziness, stomach problems, and incontinence.
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one is a measure of absolute poverty, where I dene a respondent to be poor if his or her annual income
is below 3,650 Euro (corresponding to a 10 Euro per day poverty line). The second one is a measure of
relative poverty, where I categorize a respondent to be poor if his or her annual income is less than 60% of
the country specic median income.3 These indicators also show that widowhood is more likely to imply
poverty among women than among men.
males females
p-value of p-value of the
married widowed equality test married widowed equality test
age 65.07 75.66 0.00 61.76 74.32 0.00
nancial di¢ culty (0-no, 1-yes) 0.38 0.34 0.06 0.38 0.50 0.00
net worth (1000 EUR) 214.66 188.82 0.09 212.92 138.75 0.01
nancial wealth (1000 EUR) 43.90 39.91 0.35 41.68 22.29 0.00
income (1000 EUR) 21.25 19.10 0.00 21.24 14.24 0.00
monthly expenditures on
food consumption (EUR) 337.93 300.70 0.00 335.74 273.20 0.00
self-reported health (from
1-excellent to 5-poor) 3.02 3.38 0.00 3.05 3.47 0.00
number of illnesses 1.28 1.72 0.00 1.30 1.99 0.00
number of ADL di¢ culties 0.17 0.42 0.00 0.16 0.53 0.00
number of symptoms 1.24 1.80 0.00 1.58 2.37 0.00
in absolute poverty (0-no, 1-yes) 0.045 0.038 0.32 0.047 0.077 0.00
in relative poverty (0-no, 1-yes) 0.151 0.206 0.00 0.153 0.330 0.00
sample size 11,674 926 11,809 3,957
Table 1: Descriptive statistics (sample means) based on SHARE wave 2
In Figure 1 I present the ratio of female respondents reporting nancial di¢ culties by marital status and
by country. The graph shows that widows are more likely to report nancial di¢ culties than the control
group in each country, with the largest di¤erence in Sweden. At the same time, there are large di¤erences
across countries in the prevalence of reported di¢ culties. These di¤erences can be partly due to di¤erent
nancial circumstances, but also due to di¤erent reporting behaviors. As the indicator of nancial di¢ culties
is based on a subjective measure, this indicator can be strongly inuenced by the response patterns of the
respondents. Nevertheless, this empirical problem does not invalidate the observed di¤erences between the
widows and married female respondents in each of the countries.
The SHARELIFE data also provide information on the nancial status, health, and labor force partici-
pation of widows. I transform the retrospective SHARELIFE data into a panel structure with observations
ranging from 1930 to 2009. I restrict the analysis to those respondents who have married only once (87% of
the female SHARELIFE respondents) and who are aged 50 and above in the referred year. Among all these
observation points, 4:3% of males and 18:4% of females are widowed. In Table 2 I present some descriptive
statistics for those who are widowed or married. These statistics are based on the generated panel dataset,
pooling the subsample of individuals aged 50 and above in the referred year. The widowed are older on av-
erage by about 10 years. The binary indicator of the start of nancial hardship equals one if the respondent
reports that there was a distinct period in his or her life of nancial hardship, and the starting year of that
period equals the referred year. Widowed women are more likely to report the onset of such di¢ culties than
3The country specic median income measures are generated based on the SHARE data. Due to the age restrictions of the
survey the generated poverty lines are necessarily di¤erent from the ones based on the median income of the total population.
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Figure 1: Ratio of female respondents reporting nancial di¢ culties based on SHARE wave 2
those who are married, but similar di¤erences are not observable for men, among whom the widowers are
slightly less likely to report the onset of nancial hardships. These ndings are in line with the statistics
related to nancial di¢ culties based on the second wave of SHARE (see Table 1).
The indicator of the start of poor health equals one if the respondent reports a distinct period in his or
her life of poor health, and the starting year of that period equals the referred year. The illness indicator
equals one if in the given year a period of serious illness started, which lasted for more than a year. These two
health indicators show that the widows are on average more likely to experience deteriorating health than
the control group. However, based on these statistics it is not possible to disentangle the e¤ect of widowhood
on health from the e¤ect of older age. Again, for males these di¤erences are less clear: only the subjective
indicator of poor health shows that the widowers experience worse health. The statistics also indicate that
the probabilities of leaving a job or retiring in a given year are lower for the widowed respondents. On the
one hand, this can be due to the higher motivation of the widowed to stay employed, on the other hand, if
the widowed are outside of the labor force already before the death of the spouse that can also contribute
to this nding. Similarly to Table 1, I also report the results of the t-tests of the equality of means. These
statistics indicate that the statistical signicance of the di¤erences by marital status is stronger for females
than for males, especially in case of the onset of nancial hardship and health problems.
Using generated indicators of ongoing nancial hardship, poor health and illness, the conclusions about
gender di¤erences and di¤erences along marital status are similar as based on the indicators on the onset of
adverse periods. These statistics are also presented in Table 2.
Figure 2 shows the mean of the indicators of the onset of nancial hardship, poor health, and leaving
job for females by age categories. It can be seen that the start of nancial hardship is more prevalent in the
younger age categories (age 50-69), especially among widows. Widows are on average more likely to report
worsening health status according to the indicator of poor health, irrespective of the age category. As for
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males females
p-value of p-value of
married widowed equality test married widowed equality test
age 60.71 70.50 0.00 59.71 68.65 0.00
start of nancial
hardship 0.29% 0.24% 0.45 0.27% 0.37% 0.00
start of poor health 1.31% 1.53% 0.09 1.23% 1.49% 0.00
start of illness 0.77% 0.69% 0.43 0.78% 0.86% 0.10
leave job 4.38% 2.40% 0.00 2.82% 1.46% 0.00
retire 3.90% 2.23% 0.00 2.43% 1.39% 0.00
ongoing nancial
hardship 4.68% 3.77% 0.00 5.56% 7.34% 0.00
ongoing poor health 12.23% 15.41% 0.00 12.75% 17.13% 0.00
ongoing illness 8.73% 9.98% 0.00 8.97% 11.47% 0.00
total nr. of observations
points in the panel data 175,740 7,922 184,075 41,435
nr. of individuals 9,837 739 11,897 2,969
Table 2: Descriptive statistics based on SHARELIFE life histories from age 50
leaving a job, the only clear di¤erence can be observed in the age group 60-69: those who are widowed are
less likely to leave a job in this age category. This di¤erence is due to the lower rate of retiring. When
interpreting this di¤erence it is important to keep in mind that this is a ow indicator of exit from the labor
force, which provides little information on the di¤erences between the two groups in terms of the actual
labor force status.
4 Estimated e¤ects of widowhood
4.1 Selection into widowhood and receiving survivorspension benets
Before investigating the adverse e¤ects of widowhood, I analyze which individual characteristics increase the
likelihood of being widowed. This analysis reveals some di¤erences between the widowed and the control
group prior to widowhood. I estimate three linear probability models of widowhood. First, using the second
wave of SHARE, I regress the binary indicator of widowhood on the age, years of schooling, and country
of residence of the female respondents. Next, using the SHARELIFE data, I estimate a pooled OLS and a
random e¤ects (RE) model, where the dependent variable equals one if the respondent becomes widowed in
the next year. The sample here is restricted to females who are married in the given year. The explanatory
variables in this model are again the age, years of schooling, and country of residence. Because of the
time-invariant nature of the regressors, xed e¤ects models cannot be estimated.
The results presented in Table 3 conrm that the probability of widowhood increases with age, which is a
natural consequence of the similar age of the spouses. In addition, these results show that those with higher
level of education are less likely to become widowed because the spouses die later. The cross-sectional result
indicates that one additional year of schooling decreases the likelihood of being widowed by 0:3 percentage
points. The panel results show that at ages 50 and above, one additional year of schooling decreases the
probability of becoming widowed by 0:05  0:07 percentage points. The small magnitude of the coe¢ cients
under the SHARELIFE estimations is due to the di¤erent outcome variable: out of the observations of
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Figure 2: Onset of adverse periods among females by age categories and marital status (SHARELIFE data)
married females, only for around 1:3% is the indicator of becoming widowed equal to one.
The years of schooling are considered to be predetermined in these regression models, since widowhood is
typically an old-age phenomenon, whereas education takes place at younger ages. Thus reverse causality is
not likely, which would not be true if income or wealth were included as a regressor instead of education. On
average, higher education level is associated with better socioeconomic background and with better nancial
status. As a consequence, those who are widowed are likely to be in worse nancial status than the control
group even before the widowhood due to the lower education level.
The most likely explanation for the negative e¤ect of schooling on widowhood is based on the analysis
of Sevak et al. (2003/2004). They show that the probability of the husbands death at young ages increases
if the couple lives in poverty. Thus poorer married women, who are typically less educated are also more
likely to become widowed. A second explanatory factor is that the mean age di¤erence between the husband
and wife decreases with the education level of the wife. Based on the second wave of SHARE one additional
year of schooling is estimated to decrease the age di¤erence by 0:5 year, if age and the country of residence
are controlled for. The mean age di¤erence is 2:2 years.
The presented results provide evidence for the selection into widowhood, which can contribute to the
association between widowhood and poverty. One could argue that in a similar manner, selection into
receiving survivorsbenets could also contribute to this association. Although the aim of various entitlement
rules is to ensure that those in need receive survivorspension benets, it might still be the case that e.g.
the lack of social contributions excludes the poorest widows from the benets. However, no such evidence
can be found based on the second wave of SHARE. Regressing the binary indicator of receiving survivors
pension benets on age, schooling and country dummies in the subsample of widowed females produces an
insignicant and small ( 0:003) coe¢ cient of years of schooling. If instead of the years of schooling the
binary indicator of having post secondary or tertiary education is used as a regressor then the coe¢ cient of
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Widow, Widow, SHARELIFE
SHARE pooled OLS RE
age 0.019 age 0.001 0.002
[66.93] [23.32] [38.26]
schooling -0.003 schooling -0.00046 -0.00066
[3.51] [7.85] [6.06]
constant -0.875 constant -0.041 -0.081
[30.50] [12.77] [16.98]
observation points 15,489 observation points 175,031 175,031
Number of individuals 11,445
Robust t statistics in brackets
 signicant at 10%;  signicant at 5%;  signicant at 1%
Additional controls: country dummies
Table 3: Determinants of widowhood of female respondents
this binary indicator is signicantly negative and not negligible ( 0:074). Thus using schooling as a proxy
for the economic status before widowhood indicates that on average there is no regressive selection into
receiving survivorsbenets, and there is some evidence for progressive selection. In section 5 I discuss the
importance and e¤ects of survivorspension benets in more details.
4.2 Cross sectional results
In this section I analyze the e¤ects of widowhood on economic status, health and employment, using the
second wave of SHARE. This analysis sheds light on the persistent e¤ects of widowhood. I also investigate
the cross country di¤erences in these e¤ects.
First, I estimate linear regression models of the logarithm of nancial wealth, income, and expenditures
on food, and of the binary indicators of nancial di¢ culties and poverty. The denitions of these variables
are described in section 3. As the benchmark model I estimate only a single coe¢ cient of widowhood, then
I extend the model with interactions with the binary indicators of receiving any survivorspension benets
(45% of the widows), having received a bequest of 5; 000 EUR or more from the deceased husband (7% of
the widows), the years spent in widowhood, and the education level and employment status of the widows.
These additional regressors shed light on the heterogeneous e¤ects of widowhood. If widowhood had no
adverse e¤ects then all the estimated coe¢ cients should be insignicant and close to zero. In each model
I also control for age, health status, being employed or self-employed, and I also include binary indicators
of post-secondary or tertiary education, having children, and country dummies. If no control variables are
included in the regression models then the adverse e¤ects of widowhood are overestimated. This is because
without additional controls the widowhood indicator captures the e¤ects of aging and worsening health,
among others. The estimated coe¢ cients of the widowhood indicators are reported in Table 4. In Appendix
6 I report all the estimated coe¢ cients of the rst set of models.
The estimation results indicate that widowed women have on average signicantly lower nancial wealth,
income and food expenditures per capita, and around 10 percentage points higher probability of having
nancial di¢ culties than those who are married, ceteris paribus. They are also around 4 percentage points
more likely to live below the absolute poverty line, and 16 percentage points more likely to be in relative
poverty. Receiving survivorspension is estimated to signicantly mitigate the adverse e¤ects of widowhood
on all of the poverty indicators. Receiving substantial inheritance from the deceased husband also has a
positive e¤ect on the widows economic status. However, this positive e¤ect is insignicant on the subjective
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ln(nancial nancial absolute relative
wealth) ln(income) ln(food) di¢ culty poverty poverty
widow -0.939 -0.306 -0.192 0.104 0.044 0.160
[13.30] [12.99] [13.55] [10.96] [8.83] [17.31]
R-squared 0.36 0.18 0.15 0.25 0.08 0.07
sample size 15,688 15,688 15,688 15,327 15,688 15,688
widow -1.283 -0.496 -0.233 0.130 0.076 0.234
[14.70] [14.01] [11.44] [11.35] [10.81] [19.83]
survivorspension (yes/no)  widow 0.739 0.408 0.090 -0.056 -0.068 -0.160
[6.70] [11.20] [3.07] [3.76] [8.68] [10.97]
widow -1.029 -0.319 -0.200 0.107 0.047 0.167
[14.13] [13.07] [13.48] [10.88] [8.94] [17.72]
bequest (yes/no)  widow 1.121 0.155 0.109 -0.031 -0.030 -0.084
[5.74] [2.30] [1.97] [1.14] [2.47] [3.17]
widow -0.768 -0.319 -0.175 0.096 0.075 0.159
[5.90] [7.37] [6.35] [5.86] [6.39] [9.20]
years of widowhood -0.028 0.003 -0.000 0.000 -0.000 0.000
[3.75] [1.30] [0.14] [0.03] [0.04] [0.00]
widow -1.003 -0.293 -0.191 0.101 0.046 0.168
[13.29] [11.83] [12.53] [10.02] [8.56] [17.08]
secondary or higher edu.  widow 0.568 -0.115 -0.003 0.028 -0.014 -0.074
[3.52] [1.79] [0.06] [1.12] [1.26] [3.38]
secondary or higher education 0.788 0.362 0.177 -0.106 -0.011 -0.096
[12.27] [15.63] [14.05] [11.16] [2.93] [13.59]
widow -1.060 -0.320 -0.201 0.106 0.048 0.169
[14.18] [12.71] [13.26] [10.65] [8.86] [17.26]
employed  widow 1.257 0.147 0.093 -0.024 -0.033 -0.099
[6.57] [2.42] [2.51] [0.79] [2.54] [4.06]
employed 0.472 0.420 0.048 -0.104 -0.040 -0.105
[6.84] [15.42] [3.63] [10.36] [8.01] [12.77]
Robust t statistics in brackets,  signicant at 10%;  signicant at 5%;  signicant at 1%. Additional controls:
age, number of illnesses, ADL di¢ culties, symptoms, education, employment, children, country dummies
Table 4: Estimated e¤ects of widowhood on nancial situation based on SHARE wave 2
measure of nancial di¢ culties. The length of widowhood is estimated to exacerbate the negative e¤ect of
widowhood on nancial wealth holdings. This is a reasonable nding as the lack of the second income has a
cumulative e¤ect over time. The last two specications reveal that the estimated adverse e¤ect of widowhood
on nancial wealth holdings is weaker for those who have post secondary or tertiary education (9% of the
widows), and who are still working (6% of the widows). These results are reasonable as those with higher
education and who are still working might depend less on the husbands income. As for the other dependent
variables, the moderating e¤ect of employment on poverty is clearer than that of higher education level.
These estimation results are based on wealth, income and consumption measures divided by the square
root of the household size. Assuming less scope for economies of scale in the household leads to smaller
estimated e¤ect of widowhood. The reason for this is that under such assumption the needs of the household
decrease considerably with the death of the spouse. To show this, I use here two alternative rules following
the OECD equivalence scales, but neglecting the di¤erentiation between adults and children. First, I assign
a value of 1 to the rst household member and 0.7 to each additional member. Next, I apply the same rule,
but use 0.5 instead of 0.7. If the weight of 0.7 is used then the coe¢ cients [and t-statistics] of widowhood
in the basic wealth, income and consumption regressions become -0.822 [11.78], -0.172 [7.26] and -0.058
[4.03], respectively. These estimates are smaller than the benchmark results as the weight of 0.7 implies
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relatively small scope for economies of scale in the household. On the other hand, using the weight of 0.5 the
estimated e¤ects become closer to the benchmark estimates: -0.901 [12.83], -0.263 [11.10] and -0.148 [10.40],
respectively.
As the second set of cross-sectional estimations, I estimate the e¤ect of widowhood on the number of
reported illnesses, and on the probability of being employed. These are non-nancial outcomes which can
indirectly exacerbate the adverse nancial consequences of widowhood. I report these results in Table 5.
The results indicate that widows are ceteris paribus in worse health condition. This nding corresponds to
the results of Smith and Zick (1996) for the US. Widows are also estimated to be around 5 percentage points
more likely to be employed than the control group, which is reasonable as widows are more dependent on
their own sources of income.
number of illnesses employed
widow 0.085 0.053
[2.73] [8.81]
R-squared 0.17 0.34
sample size 15,694 15,688
Robust t statistics in brackets,  signicant at 10%;  signicant at 5%;  signicant at 1%
Additional controls in health model: age, education, employment, children, country dummies
Additional controls in employment model: age, number of illnesses, ADL di¢ culties,
symptoms, education, children, country dummies
Table 5: Estimated e¤ects of widowhood on health and employment based on SHARE wave 2
I also estimate the models of nancial outcomes with allowing for country specic e¤ects of widowhood.
The coe¢ cients of interest are reported in Table 6. Results on the poverty indicators are not reported here as
those indicators are generated using the income measure, thus these estimates lead to similar conclusions as
the results on income. The reported estimation results show that widowhood has negative e¤ect on nancial
wealth holdings in all countries. This negative e¤ect is the strongest in the two post-socialist countries
and Greece, whereas the weakest in Switzerland where the estimated e¤ect is close to zero and statistically
insignicant. The estimated average e¤ect of widowhood on income is also negative for all countries. The
same holds for consumption expenditures, with the exception of Spain. Finally, widowhood is estimated to
exacerbate nancial di¢ culties in all of the countries, with the strongest e¤ect in Sweden. The strong e¤ect
for Sweden is in line with Figure 1 but cannot be seen based on the short run e¤ects, as discussed in section
4.3.
A strong negative estimated e¤ect of widowhood on nancial circumstances indicates that due to the
entitlement rules some widows who are in need do not receive survivorsbenets or the general amount of
the survivorsbenets is low. In a country where widowhood does not have adverse nancial consequences,
the estimated coe¢ cients of widowhood should be zero. I return to these results in section 5, where I also
discuss the various survivorspension systems in the analyzed European countries.
4.3 SHARELIFE results
Using the retrospective SHARELIFE data, I estimate linear probability xed e¤ects models on the e¤ects
of widowhood. These estimations extend the previously presented results by focusing here on the short run
e¤ects. Thus we can learn if the long run e¤ects are due to long lasting widowhood status or the adverse
e¤ects appear soon after the husbands death. I analyze ve dependent variables: the onset of periods
with nancial hardship, poor health, serious illness, leaving job and retiring. The denitions of the analyzed
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Coe¢ cients of widowhood
ln(nancial nancial
wealth) ln(income) ln(food) di¢ culties
AT -1.049 -0.232 -0.162 0.132
[4.23] [4.35] [2.89] [3.64]
DE -0.598 -0.192 -0.221 0.116
[2.86] [3.13] [3.40] [3.32]
SE -0.447 -0.415 -0.503 0.217
[2.19] [7.13] [6.56] [5.96]
NL -0.502 -0.149 -0.298 0.119
[2.56] [3.18] [3.77] [3.60]
ES -0.366 -0.209 0.007 0.099
[1.37] [1.90] [0.20] [2.84]
IT -1.188 -0.076 -0.027 0.058
[4.51] [0.91] [0.95] [1.90]
FR -0.193 -0.232 -0.158 0.084
[1.42] [4.84] [3.46] [2.85]
DK -1.087 -0.367 -0.342 0.091
[5.82] [10.54] [5.46] [3.56]
GR -1.328 -0.174 -0.084 0.079
[5.59] [2.07] [3.37] [3.29]
CH -0.056 -0.174 -0.300 0.087
[0.26] [2.96] [3.57] [2.31]
BE -0.788 -0.251 -0.251 0.093
[5.30] [4.39] [4.71] [3.33]
CZ -2.088 -0.268 -0.253 0.143
[8.99] [7.78] [6.41] [5.12]
PL -1.262 -0.422 -0.044 0.086
[5.31] [7.74] [1.61] [3.42]
Robust t statistics in brackets,  signicant at 10%;  signicant at 5%;  signicant at 1%
Additional controls: age, number of illnesses, ADL di¢ culties, symptoms, education,
employment, children, country dummies
Table 6: Country specic estimated e¤ects of widowhood based on SHARE wave 2
variables are provided in section 3. The generated panel data is restricted to data points at age 50 and above.
The estimated results are comparable to the average marginal e¤ects based on random e¤ects probit models.
I prefer the linear probability xed e¤ects model in the current application since that allows the indicator
of becoming widowed to be correlated with the unobserved individual characteristics, such as unobserved
behaviors and living conditions. Apart from the widowhood indicator, I also include the squared age as
regressor in the xed e¤ects models, to capture potentially non-linear age e¤ects.
In Table 7 I report the estimated coe¢ cients of becoming widowed in the given year, and one or two years
before. The coe¢ cients of the lagged indicators can reveal if the adverse e¤ect typically begins only one or
two years after the husbands death. In the models of leaving job and retiring I also include the indicator of
becoming widowed in the next year. The reason for this extension is that if the husband needs personal care
near the end of his life then the wife might choose to exit the labor market so as to provide care. The results
indicate that if a woman leaves her job due to (or prior to) widowhood then that happens predominantly
via retiring.
The models of all ve outcome variables indicate that the adverse e¤ects of the husbands death appear
already within the same year, and these e¤ects are weaker one or two years after. However, this nding can
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be due to measurement error following from the survey method. Since it is a retrospective survey, the widows
might recall the negative life experiences as related to the event of the husbands death. For example, if the
period of nancial hardship started one year after the death of the husband then that might still be reported
as starting in the same year. Thus the immediate adverse e¤ects can be overestimated and the lagged (and
lead) e¤ects underestimated.4
Becoming widowed increases the likelihood of reporting an onset of nancial hardship or poor health in
the same year by around 3 percentage points, ceteris paribus, and these e¤ects are signicant. The likelihood
of becoming seriously ill also increases due to widowhood, but this is less prevalent than reporting poor health
status. Women are also more likely to retire in the year of the death of the husband. An explanation for
this nding can be that after retirement the wives can devote more time to the needs of the husband. This
explanation is supported by the positive coe¢ cient of becoming widowed in the next year: the worsening
health of the husband might induce the wife to retire. This lead e¤ect of one year is weaker than the e¤ect
estimated for the year of the husbands death. At rst sight the higher likelihood of retirement due to the
husbands death ("ow" SHARELIFE results) and the higher probability of employment status of widows
("stock" SHARE results) seem to contradict each other. However, the early retirement of some widows
and the postponed retirement of others are compatible, and can explain both the cross sectional and panel
results.
If I interact the indicator of the husbands death in the current year with the age of the widow then these
extended estimations indicate that the e¤ect of widowhood on nancial hardship and leaving job decreases
with age. Thus the immediate detrimental e¤ects on the economic status of the widow are estimated to be
more severe if the widow is younger.
Finally, I reestimate the model of the onset of nancial hardship with the inclusion of the indicators of
the onset of poor health and leaving job as explanatory variables. These estimation results are reported
in the last column of Table 7. Under this specication the estimated e¤ect of becoming widowed is close
to the results of the rst specication, although both poor health and leaving job signicantly increase
the probability of reporting nancial hardship. These results imply that widowhood has a direct e¤ect on
the nancial circumstances, and the indirect e¤ects through health and changing employment status are
relatively minor, although signicant.
Simple descriptive (unconditional) analysis of the data also indicates that the adverse e¤ects of widowhood
commence already in the year of the husbands death. In Figure 3 I depict the frequency of the onset of
nancial hardship, poor health, illness, and retirement indicators as a function of years in widowhood. The
graph clearly shows an increase in these indicators around the husbands death. The propensity to retire
starts to increase already before widowhood. Although these statistics cannot lter out the age e¤ect, there
is no clear long run increasing pattern in the indicators of the onset of health problems or nancial di¢ culties.
However, these statistics overestimate the immediate adverse e¤ects of widowhood, as compared to the xed
e¤ects results. It is important to keep in mind that the nancial and health indicators do not show the
current state of the respondent but if a period of adverse circumstances starts in the given year. The graph
only indicates that new periods of di¢ culties are more likely to start at the year of the husbands death,
but it might be that the nancial hardships remain throughout the entire period of widowhood. Figure 4
provides evidence for this hypothesis. This graph shows the ratio of widowed respondents who experience
nancial hardship, poor health or serious illness and who are retired in the given year before or after the
4Garrouste and Paccagnella (2011) and Havari and Mazzonna (2011) investigate the accuracy of retrospective assessments
in the SHARELIFE data. They analyze the recall bias in childhood health, demographics, employment, and social networks.
Their general conclusion is that overall the SHARELIFE data are reliable.
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start of nancial start of start of start of nancial
hardship poor health illness leave job retire hardship
become widow 0.032 0.033 0.007 0.015 0.015 0.031
the current year [8.46] [7.53] [2.84] [4.01] [4.09] [8.35]
become widow 0.002 0.005 0.000 0.000 -0.001 0.002
the previous year [1.74] [1.76] [0.11] [0.04] [0.40] [1.71]
become widow -0.001 -0.002 -0.001 -0.004 -0.005 -0.001
2 years before [0.69] [0.46] [0.54] [1.73] [1.97] [0.63]
become widow 0.006 0.007
the next year [1.91] [2.03]
start of poor health 0.008
[3.70]
leave job 0.011
[6.71]
age2/10,000 -0.005 0.018 0.007 -0.105 -0.095 -0.004
[5.89] [8.35] [3.65] [37.18] [35.77] [4.67]
constant 0.004 0.004 0.004 0.067 0.061 0.003
[12.30] [4.72] [5.37] [59.68] [57.25] [9.88]
observation points 212,534 212,534 212,534 200,116 200,116 212,534
individuals 12,418 12,418 12,418 12,270 12,270 12,418
Robust t statistics in brackets
 signicant at 10%;  signicant at 5%;  signicant at 1%
Table 7: Estimated e¤ects of becoming widowed at age 50 or above based on SHARELIFE
husbands death. These "stock" indicators equal one in a given year if the onset of the di¢ culties occurred
in an earlier year and the di¢ culties are still ongoing in the particular year. As it can be seen, there is an
increase in the occurrence of adverse circumstances the year after widowhood, but afterwards the average
probabilities of di¢ culties remain approximately constant. The probability of being retired also increases
before and around the death of the husband, but attens out afterwards.
The SHARELIFE survey asks not only the beginning year of nancial hardship, poor health and illness
periods, but also the ending year of those. Based on these details the length of the adverse periods can be
calculated. If the period of nancial hardship or bad health is still ongoing at the time of the interview, I
dene the ending year as 2009. According to the SHARELIFE statistics, if a period of nancial hardship
starts at the year of widowhood then that lasts on average for 6.6 years, with a median of 5 years. The
length of reported poor health is of similar magnitude, whereas the mean and median length of a serious
illness are longer by 1:5  2:5 years. Thus the estimated adverse e¤ects of widowhood are not transient, but
typically last for several years. Considering the censoring of these variables at year 2009 the actual length of
the adverse circumstances can even be longer. Estimating zero-inated negative binomial regressions on the
pooled SHARELIFE data indicates that the death of the husband increases the expected length of nancial
hardship, poor health and illness at the average by around 2, 3 and 1 months, respectively. These estimated
e¤ects refer to di¢ culties starting at the year of the husbands death.5
I re-estimate the xed e¤ects models of the onset of nancial hardship, poor health, illness, and retirement
with allowing the immediate, lagged, and lead e¤ects of widowhood to vary across countries. Since the
5The dependent variable is the length of the analyzed adverse period starting in the given year. Apart from the indicators
of the husbands death, I also control for age and age squared in these pooled estimations. In the nancial hardship model I
also include the binary indicators of poor health and leaving job as control variables. The estimated e¤ects are not conditional
on reporting a period of nancial hardship, poor health or illness, thus if someone does not report such condition then the
dependent variable in these zero-inated negative binomial regression models is set to zero.
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Figure 3: Dynamics of the onset of nancial hardship, health problems, and retirement before and after the
husbands death, based on SHARELIFE (females becoming widowed at age 50+)
strongest e¤ects are observed in the same year of becoming widowed, I report only these e¤ects in Table 8.
The country specic e¤ects of widowhood on illness and retiring are signicant only for few of the
countries. The average e¤ect is small on these outcome variables, and due to the smaller country specic
sample sizes the standard errors of the country specic coe¢ cients are relatively large. As for the indicators
of nancial hardship and poor health, the di¤erences in the e¤ect of widowhood across countries are clearer.
Sweden, Denmark, and Switzerland are estimated to fare the best in these aspects: nancial hardship and
poor health status do not become signicantly more likely in the year of becoming widowed in these countries.
The most severe estimated immediate e¤ects of widowhood are observed in Italy, France, and Poland. In
these countries the death of the husband is estimated to immediately increase the probability of reporting
nancial di¢ culties and poor health status, these e¤ects are strongly signicant, and are around 5 percentage
points in magnitude.6
The cross-country variations in the short run (Table 8) and long run (Table 6) e¤ects of widowhood
show some di¤erent patterns. For example, in Italy the immediate strong e¤ect of widowhood on nancial
hardships seems to subside over the years, according to the cross-sectional results on nancial di¢ culties. In
some other countries, like in Germany and Sweden the immediate e¤ects of widowhood on nancial problems
are insignicant, whereas in the long run these e¤ects become signicantly positive. The di¤erences in the
adverse e¤ects of widowhood can be partly due to di¤erences in the survivors pension systems (e.g. in
Sweden the survivorspension is generally paid only for 12 months, which might cause the weak short run
but strong long run estimated e¤ects).
6One of the anonymous referees pointed out that age di¤erences between couples can also inuence the nancial status
of the widows. Using the SHARELIFE estimation results and average age di¤erences based on the second wave of SHARE,
the estimated immediate e¤ect of widowhood on nancial hardship is stronger in countries where the average age di¤erences
are higher. However, no clear relations are found between the average age di¤erences and the long run estimated e¤ects of
widowhood, as presented in Table 6.
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Figure 4: Dynamics of the nancial, health and retirement status before and after the husbands death,
based on SHARELIFE (females becoming widowed at age 50+)
5 Survivorspensions
5.1 Institutions
Survivors pensions can mitigate the poverty of widows, as these can partly compensate for the loss of
the husbands income. By the middle of the 20th century, some type of survivors pension benet was
provided in all of the analyzed countries.7 There are di¤erences across the analyzed European countries with
respect to the entitlement rules and benet levels of the survivorspensions. Details of these country specic
characteristics are provided by Monticone et al. (2008) and MISSOC (2010).
In all countries the entitlement to survivorspension is conditioned. The conditions are often related
to the insurance status of the deceased spouse and to the age of the widow. The benets are typically
dened as a percentage of the pension benets to which the deceased spouse would have been entitled to.
The Netherlands is an exception with this respect, where the basic survivorsbenet is a at-rate amount.
The survivorspension is typically an annuity type benet, but in the Netherlands and Sweden the widows
cannot receive this type of benet after reaching retirement age, and in Denmark the benet is a lump sum
payment. In the rst column of Table 9 I present the basic magnitude of the survivorspensions. The second
column shows the percentage of widowed respondents in the second wave of SHARE who report receiving
survivorspension benets. The cross country variation in this ratio reects the di¤erent entitlement rules.
For example, the low ratio of recipients in the Netherlands and Sweden corresponds to the age restriction of
recipients, i.e. the surviving spouse is aged less than 65.
7The International Labour Organization (2012) provides information on the date of the rst laws related to survivorspen-
sion.
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Coe¢ cients of becoming widowed
start of nancial start of start of
hardship poor health illness retire
AT 0.041 0.033 -0.006 0.014
[1.97] [1.53] [3.13] [0.75]
DE 0.015 0.050 0.012 -0.009
[1.28] [2.15] [0.96] [0.93]
SE 0.007 0.016 0.021 0.025
[0.91] [1.12] [1.46] [1.31]
NL 0.035 0.027 0.016 0.022
[2.21] [1.66] [1.28] [1.46]
ES 0.024 0.050 0.015 -0.005
[2.14] [2.75] [1.34] [2.55]
IT 0.051 0.043 -0.004 0.009
[3.20] [2.66] [0.71] [0.85]
FR 0.026 0.049 0.003 0.011
[2.30] [2.99] [0.42] [0.93]
DK 0.011 -0.003 0.008 0.023
[1.29] [0.59] [0.88] [1.31]
GR 0.052 0.017 -0.003 0.035
[4.11] [1.79] [0.65] [3.09]
CH 0.019 0.034 -0.002 0.025
[1.32] [1.60] [2.14] [1.19]
BE 0.021 0.048 0.008 0.018
[2.44] [3.46] [1.11] [1.83]
CZ 0.048 0.008 0.022 0.005
[3.18] [0.83] [1.64] [0.31]
PL 0.065 0.056 0.01 0.012
[3.35] [2.84] [0.92] [0.83]
Robust t statistics in brackets
 signicant at 10%;  signicant at 5%;  signicant at 1%
Additional controls: age squared, country specic lagged e¤ects
and lead e¤ects (retirement model) of widowhood
Table 8: Country specic estimated immediate e¤ects of becoming widowed at age 50 or above, based on
SHARELIFE
5.2 Relation to the adverse e¤ects of widowhood
There is no clear relationship between the estimated adverse e¤ects of widowhood on income, wealth and
consumption expenditures, and the basic replacement rate of the survivorspension benets.
Based on the rst part of Table 6, widowhood has the most detrimental e¤ect on the objective indicators
of economic status in Denmark, Sweden, the Czech Republic, and Poland. These countries have various
policies of survivorspensions, and in Poland the basic benets are among the most generous ones. A strong
adverse e¤ect of widowhood can indicate strong reliance on the deceased husbands income, low amounts of
survivorspension benets, and bad targeting of the benets.
Similar conclusions can be drawn based on the SHARELIFE estimates of Table 8. The death of the
husband is the least likely to lead immediately to nancial hardships in Denmark, Germany, Sweden, and
Switzerland. However, these countries - especially Denmark from 1992 on - are not the ones that provide the
most generous survivorspension benets according to the basic replacement rates. On the other hand, in the
Czech Republic, Greece, Italy, and Poland the death of the husband signicantly increases the probability of
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% deceased spouses pension % widowed receiving Survivorspension/ Survivorspension/old-age
and lump sum benets survivorspension GDP (%), 2007 pension (%), 2007
AT 0-60% 45.57 1.95 22.02
BE 80% 41.91 1.84 27.37
CZ 50% + 84 EUR/month 42.15 0.73 11.84
DK 50% of capitalized value + 15.49 0.00 0.00
+ 6,700 EUR lump sum
FR 54% (60% in the 55.24 1.78 17.04
complementary schemes)
DE 25% 52.88 2.03 25.63
GR 50% 35.07 1.96 28.84
IT 60% 57.94 2.43 21.62
NL Basic monthly benet: 1,100 EUR 20.96 0.25 5.68
PL 85% 22.49 1.73 26.99
ES 52% 60.40 1.90 35.64
SE 55% 11.66 0.51 7.92
CH 80% 27.50 0.97 10.54
Source Monticone et al. (2008) SHARE wave 2 OECD (2012) OECD (2012)
and MISSOC (2010)
Table 9: Indicators of the generosity of survivorspension systems
nancial di¢ culties by about 5 percentage points, although in these countries the survivorspension system
is relatively generous. These results point out the importance of entitlement rules and deviations from the
basic replacement rates in mitigating the adverse nancial e¤ects of widowhood.
Apart from the o¢ cial replacement rates, the aggregate expenditures on survivors pensions can also
capture the generosity of survivorsbenets. Such indicators are reported in the last two columns of Table
9, based on OECD statistics. These statistics refer to public and mandatory private benets.8 A potential
caveat of the analysis based on these statistics is that the generosity of the survivorspension systems might
change throughout time due to pension reforms. If this is the case then the observed poverty of widows
in the SHARE and SHARELIFE data might for example be the consequence of the low level of pension
benets during the earlier years of widowhood. However, the general pattern across the countries is that the
relative expenditures on survivorsbenets have decreased or remained stable since 1990.9 In Germany the
relative expenditures changed considerably after the reunication, when the aggregate relative expenditures
on survivorspensions increased. In Greece and Spain the OECD indicators show considerable increase in the
relative expenditures in year 2006. For the rest of the countries the country specic characteristics around
years 2007-2009 can capture well the generosity of the survivorspension benets through the period when
the majority of widowhood occurred among the SHARE respondents. Based on the SHARELIFE data, only
around 20% of the widows report that the death of the husband happened before 1990.
Figure 5 illustrates how the estimated e¤ects of widowhood (as presented in Table 6, columns 3 and 4)
are related to the indicators of the generosity of survivorspension benets. In order to simplify the analysis,
I focus here only on the e¤ects of widowhood on food consumption expenditures and nancial di¢ culties,
as two representative variables for the nancial status of widows. The tted linear regression lines visualize
the patterns of the relations.10 The basic replacement rate of survivorspensions is only weakly related to
8 In these OECD statisitcs the lump sum benets in the Danish system are not counted as pension benets.
9Although for most of the countries the OECD provides statistics on survivorspensions expenditures also for years before
1990, due to a break in methodology from 1990 onwards those earlier statistics are not comparable to the later ones.
10Austria, the Czech Republic, Denmark, and the Netherlands are excluded from the rst panel of Figure 5 since in these
countries the basic magnitude of the survivors pension benets relative to the deceased spouses pension cannot be determined.
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the estimated adverse e¤ects of widowhood, and these relations are insignicant. Therefore, the estimation
results suggest that a higher o¢ cial replacement rate of survivorspensions in itself cannot avoid widowhood
poverty. However, as expected, the magnitude of aggregate survivorspension benets relative to GDP is
in a signicantly positive relation with the estimated long run e¤ect of widowhood on consumption, and in
a signicant negative relation with the estimated e¤ect on nancial di¢ culties. These results imply that
eligibility rules and conditional deviations from the basic replacement rates can partly achieve that survivors
pension benets mitigate the adverse e¤ects of widowhood on the economic status. Finally, the adverse e¤ects
of widowhood on consumption expenditures and nancial di¢ culties are less severe in countries with higher
ratio of survivorspension relative to old-age pension expenditures. This is an intuitive result - wider coverage
and higher amount of survivorsbenets help avoid poverty in widowhood. However, aiming for universal
coverage and high survivorsbenets might contradict the e¢ ciency goal of pension systems and take away
resources from old-age pension benets.
As there is no perfect measure for the generosity of survivorsbenets, the presented results should be
interpreted carefully. The aggregate statistics on survivorspension expenditures are subject to measure-
ment di¢ culties - due to di¤erences in the pension systems it is impossible to make the statistics perfectly
comparative across countries, and these simple statistics also cannot capture the complexity of the pension
systems. Therefore the results can reveal only some basic patterns of the relation between the economic
consequences of widowhood and the coarsely measured generosity of the survivorspension systems.
5.3 Discussion
Is the poverty of widows due to the lack of adequate level of survivorsbenets? Or is it rather due to myopic
decisions of couples? If there were perfect insurance markets then individuals could take insurance against
the loss of income if outliving their spouses. In addition, privately purchased annuity and life insurance
contracts can be preferable as these do not have such distortive implications as mandatory social security
systems have. The main arguments for the provision of public survivors benets can be based not on
e¢ ciency but on equity. It can avoid grievous poverty of widows, but an equitable system should provide
only limited benets to those who are relatively well-o¤. In this aspect the Dutch system can be a good
example since there the payable amount of survivorsbenets is reduced by the income of the surviving
spouse.
Joint annuities (survivor annuities) could mitigate the negative nancial consequences of widowhood
through providing retirement income to the surviving partner. As for the US, Hurd and Wise (1989) point
out that the absence of life insurance is an important explanatory factor of the widowspoverty. Yermo (2000)
reports that except for the United Kingdom, in the OECD countries the private annuity markets are in an
incipient stage. According to Yermo, potential explanatory factors for the underdevelopment of annuity
markets are myopic behavior, bequest motives, and the prevalence of dened benet pension plans. The
SHARE data also provide information if the respondents receive income from regular life insurance payments,
private annuity or private personal pension payments. Based on the second survey wave, only 3% of the
widows report receiving such income, it is the most widespread in Denmark, Sweden and Switzerland.
Brown and Poterba (2000) provide some explanation for the limited demand for joint life annuities. They
show that the utility gain from annuitization is smaller for couples than for single individuals, partly due to
Denmark is also excluded in the second and third panel.
The signicance levels of the coe¢ cients of the tted regression lines neglect the two-stage estimation, i.e. that the dependent
variables here are estimated coe¢ cients from the regressions on the e¤ects of widowhood.
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Figure 5: Relation between the estimated e¤ects of widowhood (y-axis) and indicators of the survivors
pension systems (tted regression coe¢ cients: * signicant at 10%, ** at 5%, *** at 1%)
the risk sharing (bequests) between couples. In addition, bequest motives towards the children and medical
expenditure uncertainties can further reduce the demand for joint life annuities.
The results presented in section 4.2, Table 4 show that the adverse e¤ects of widowhood on nancial cir-
cumstances are less severe for working and more educated women. Thus the negative nancial consequences
of widowhood can be at least partly due to the lack of independence of women in the household. Gender
di¤erences in career patterns contribute to the poverty among widows.
A potential pitfall of the empirical analysis of this paper is that bequests from the deceased husband and
support received from the children cannot be fully taken into account, thus the adverse e¤ects of widowhood
might be overestimated. If the children inherit a substantial part of their fathers wealth then even though the
wealth of the widow decreases, her actual economic situation should worsen to a less extent due to the likely
nancial support from the children. The support received from children might increase after the death of
the husband even in the absence of bequests - to check this hypotheses we would need su¢ ciently long panel
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observations on widowhood and support. Based on these considerations the negative e¤ect of widowhood
on nancial status can be overestimated, as the nancial wealth, income and consumption variables do not
capture the help received from children. However, the estimated e¤ects of widowhood on the indicators of
nancial di¢ culties and hardships are not subject to such bias.
Cohabitation (with the children) can mitigate the adverse nancial consequences of widowhood. Speci-
cation checks indicate that living alone has negative e¤ect on nancial status, when measured by consumption
expenditures and reported nancial di¢ culties. Based on the SHARE wave 2 data, widows are the least
likely to live alone in Italy, Poland and Spain, which can contribute to the relatively mild long run e¤ect of
widowhood on consumption expenditures and nancial di¢ culties in these countries (as reported in Table
6).
6 Conclusions
In this paper I analyze how and to what extent widowhood contributes to the adverse nancial circumstances
of women at age 50 and above. I compare these e¤ects across 13 European countries, using SHARE and
SHARELIFE data.
The descriptive statistics show that widows have on average lower wealth holdings, income and food
expenditures, and worse health status than married women within the same age category. These di¤erences
are more robust for women than for men. However, the observed di¤erences can be partly due to the di¤erent
average age of widows and married women. I also provide evidence that widowhood is not random in the
sense that the earlier death of the husband is more likely in households with worse socioeconomic background.
I estimate the e¤ects of widowhood by multiple cross-sectional regressions, and also by xed e¤ects
regressions. The cross-sectional estimations are based on the second wave of SHARE, whereas the panel
estimations are based on the third, retrospective wave, the so-called SHARELIFE.
The cross-sectional results indicate that widows are ceteris paribus in worse health condition, and in
worse nancial status than married women. However, the nancial conditions are estimated to be relatively
better if the widow receives survivorspension, or if the deceased husband left bequest on her. The negative
e¤ect of widowhood on nancial wealth holdings is stronger if the widowhood lasted longer. According
to the SHARELIFE estimations, the death of the husband increases the likelihood of reporting nancial
di¢ culties and poor health status in the same year by around 3 percentage points. These increasing e¤ects
are signicant. In addition, women are ceteris paribus 1.5 percentage points more likely to retire in the year
of the husbandsdeath, which can contribute to the negative e¤ect on nancial status.
The cross-country di¤erences in the e¤ect of widowhood on nancial di¢ culties cannot be explained by
the di¤erences in the generosity of survivorspensions, but in countries with higher aggregate expenditures
on survivors pension benets the adverse nancial e¤ects of widowhood are less severe. Cross-country
di¤erences in the support provided by children can contribute to the varying e¤ect of widowhood.
The results of the paper show that although the death of the husband directly increases the likelihood of
poverty, there are also signicant albeit relatively small indirect e¤ects through the deteriorated health and
earlier retirement of the widows. In this paper I provide some results on the short run dynamics of adverse
circumstances after the death of the husband in addition to the long run e¤ects. More detailed analysis of
the long run poverty dynamics in widowhood in Europe remains for further research.
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Appendix
Estimation results: cross-sectional models
ln(nancial nancial absolute relative
wealth) ln(income) ln(food) di¢ culty poverty poverty
widow -0.939 -0.306 -0.192 0.104 0.044 0.160
[13.30] [12.99] [13.55] [10.96] [8.83] [17.31]
age -0.008 0.007 -0.008 -0.006 -0.002 -0.001
[2.37] [5.28] [9.76] [13.14] [8.84] [2.86]
nr. of illnesses -0.035 0.005 0.005 0.013 -0.003 -0.001
[1.53] [0.54] [0.93] [4.23] [1.60] [0.48]
nr. of ADL di¢ culties -0.195 -0.025 -0.064 0.017 0.006 0.006
[5.46] [1.97] [5.14] [3.85] [2.31] [1.40]
nr. of symptoms -0.087 -0.020 -0.009 0.026 0.002 0.006
[4.77] [3.01] [2.07] [10.22] [1.72] [2.67]
post secondary or 0.875 0.344 0.176 -0.100 -0.014 -0.107
tertiary edu. [14.61] [15.78] [12.74] [11.21] [3.66] [15.52]
employed 0.562 0.431 0.055 -0.102 -0.042 -0.112
[8.24] [16.06] [4.20] [10.32] [8.53] [13.61]
has child -0.078 -0.068 -0.027 0.020 0.001 0.046
[0.77] [1.77] [1.09] [1.36] [0.16] [3.70]
DE 0.681 -0.015 -0.116 0.022 0.020 0.049
[5.14] [0.36] [3.32] [1.06] [2.61] [2.57]
SE 1.351 -0.026 -0.375 -0.025 0.006 0.051
[10.38] [0.68] [10.10] [1.20] [0.92] [2.69]
NL 0.983 0.220 -0.182 -0.040 0.002 0.036
[7.62] [5.75] [5.20] [1.96] [0.32] [1.92]
ES -1.068 -0.731 0.112 0.325 0.076 0.054
[6.85] [12.58] [3.50] [14.32] [7.38] [2.72]
IT -1.335 -0.500 -0.006 0.364 0.051 0.051
[9.07] [9.50] [0.20] [17.22] [5.92] [2.73]
FR 0.667 0.079 0.052 0.116 0.011 0.072
[5.19] [1.98] [1.51] [5.41] [1.51] [3.80]
DK 1.261 -0.056 -0.477 -0.084 0.007 0.125
[9.46] [1.55] [12.90] [4.27] [1.06] [6.39]
GR -3.919 -0.740 -0.008 0.468 0.073 0.055
[24.87] [13.56] [0.26] [22.98] [8.07] [2.96]
CH 1.813 0.199 -0.015 -0.034 0.009 0.077
[12.61] [4.49] [0.39] [1.49] [1.14] [3.49]
BE 1.326 -0.075 0.060 0.046 0.015 0.008
[10.44] [1.82] [1.76] [2.22] [2.04] [0.43]
CZ -2.170 -0.585 -0.192 0.312 0.009 -0.078
[14.01] [16.08] [5.77] [14.46] [1.24] [4.41]
PL -4.366 -1.092 -0.421 0.473 0.210 0.035
[27.39] [25.42] [12.82] [22.60] [15.99] [1.79]
constant 9.252 9.344 6.270 0.553 0.160 0.195
[34.65] [91.11] [100.37] [14.89] [8.15] [5.66]
sample size 15,688 15,688 15,688 15,327 15,688 15,688
R-squared 0.36 0.18 0.15 0.25 0.08 0.07
Robust t statistics in brackets,  signicant at 10%;  signicant at 5%;  signicant at 1%
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